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Committee on
International Relations
U.S. House of
Representatives
Washington, D.C.
20515-0128 |
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Timothy A.
Peters
Founder/Helping Hands Korea
October 27th, 2005
House Committee on International Relations
Joint Hearing
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights,
and International Operations
Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific
Chairman Smith and Chairman Leach, I would like to
thank you both for this opportunity to share my recent
experiences relating to North Korean refugees and the extreme
difficulties they, and we activists, face in China and its
surrounding countries. I believe that this hearing is most
timely and appreciate the attention and concern you and your
respective Subcommittees have devoted to this grave human
rights problem.
As was the case when I was invited to appear before the
International Relations Committee, first in May of 2002, then
again in April of 2004, I would like to give prominent place
to the fellow activists who have sacrificed so much in
rescuing North Korean refugees. In 2002, I highlighted the
imprisonment in China of South Korean Pastor Chun Ki Won. Last
year, among others, I cited South Korean Choi Young Hoon, who
to this day remains detained in China for a period that now is
approaching a full three years. In my written statement, I
will include a fuller listing of all known detained activists
and refugees (see Appendix I), but I would like to emphasize
one case in particular today. This year the arrow of
misfortune has struck closer to home. Fellow American, Pastor
Phillip Jun Buck, aged 68, was detained in May of this year in
his courageous work of sheltering and protecting North Korean
refugees. I am mentioning Pastor Buck in part because I have
the privilege of knowing him personally and cherish the honor
of being among the supporters of his refugee shelters in
recent years. Phillip Buck would appear quietly and
unannounced at our weekly Catacomb meetings in Seoul. He would
then share uplifting testimonies from his refugee shelters in
China. Particularly worrisome to his family and loved ones,
Pastor Buck suffers from severe sleep disorders that stem from
an auto accident in Russia years ago, and which pose
particular hardships under prison conditions in China.
I would ask, Gentlemen, that just as you exerted such swift
and critical influence with the Chinese government that
resulted in the release of Chun Ki Won in August of 2002, that
you would give equal attention and commitment to the unjust
and harsh imprisonment of fellow American Pastor Phillip Jun
Buck. His case is particularly urgent as the bitterly cold
winter of northeastern China is very nigh. Our experience with
other detainees suggests that his prison cell will be unheated
in temperatures that will plunge many degrees below zero. (see
Appendix II)
At this point, I would like to draw attention to the fact that
a full year has now elapsed since the passage of the landmark
North Korean Human Rights Act. of 2004. Many in the activist
community remain, as I am, grateful to you and your colleagues
for drafting and unanimously passing this legislation. At the
same time, I am compelled to be candid in my assessment.
During my extensive travels related to the refugee assistance
work of Helping Hands Korea in the past 12 months, which
included trips to China and its surrounding southeastern and
northeastern countries, I have become increasingly troubled. A
few examples, I hope, will illustrate the causes of my
concern.
In this past summer, on the very morning that I was about to
depart for China, I was given an update of a most dire
situation pertaining to a 17-year old North Korean girl and
her sister, who had been hiding in a shelter after wading
across the Tumen River. For the teenagers, this had been their
second hazardous crossing. The first exodus had been in the
company of their parents, and had taken place, to the best of
our knowledge, in late 2004. The girls' father had been an
army officer in the military of the DPRK. Tragically, the
entire family of four had been caught, as so many refugees
are, by the Chinese authorities and quickly repatriated. It
should come as no surprise that the girls' father, upon his
return, was swiftly executed for the DPRK capital crime of
betraying the Fatherland. The army officer's wife, the teens’
mother, was sent to a political prison camp. In the wake of
these extraordinary personal tragedies, the two teen daughters
demonstrated amazing resourcefulness and somehow managed to
make a furtive second crossing into China. Shortly thereafter,
a fellow activist brought their plight to my attention. On the
very morning that was I was to leave for China, I was told
that the younger, 14 year-old sister had wandered away from
the secret shelter and was picked up by the Chinese police.
Thanks to the arrangement of another activist here in the US,
I was able to meet with US Embassy officials in Beijing during
that visit. I shared my urgent and grave concerns for the
safety and fragile psychological state of the 17 year-old
North Korean girl, who had so recently lost her father to a
firing squad, her mother to the gulag and her sister to a
Chinese police sweep. There was no question that there was
sympathy in the room among those that were in the meeting. I
proceeded to ask if there was any way that the US Embassy
could help in this extraordinary emergency. Might it be
possible, for example, to secretly bring the teen under the
protection of the US by slipping her into an embassy vehicle?
Then I was startled by the response of one of the political
officers of the embassy. I felt as though he took on almost a
scolding attitude towards me, cautioning me against what he
seemed to perceive as rash activities by North Korean human
rights activists. In response to my pointed request for direct
assistance for the psychologically shell-shocked teenager, the
political officer replied that there was nothing that could be
done by the embassy, except that an inquiry could me made with
Chinese officials as a way to prevent the repatriation of the
younger sister. I was then urged to seek out the assistance of
the UNHCR office in Beijing. I thought to myself, "Is this the
State Department's idea of implementation of the North Korean
Human Rights Act?"
A second example: Only two months ago, I was informed that
eight North Korean refugees who had made their way across the
Sino-Vietnamese border had been kidnapped and were being held
for ransom in a private house by a corrupt Vietnamese official
near the border. In this difficult and rare case, we activists
felt that the lives of the eight were in the balance, so did
our utmost to negotiate a reduced ransom. We were successful
and the refugees were released to our co-worker on the ground
in Vietnam. I then immediately communicated their predicament
to US Embassy officials in Seoul, asking if their counterparts
in Vietnam could take the eight refugees under their
protection to prevent further kidnapping and extortion. A
message from the US Embassy in Vietnam and the State
Department was relayed to me that, no, this would not be
possible. To add insult to injury, because of strained
diplomatic relations stemming from the airlift of about 480
North Korean refugees from Vietnam to South Korea last year,
the South Korean Foreign Ministry recommended to the US
Embassy official in Seoul that perhaps the best solution would
be for us to take the eight refugees to yet another country!
We could hardly believe our ears that a US Embassy official
would relay such a message. In fact, however, that course of
action was exactly what we were forced to do: guide the eight
North Koreans across yet another dangerous frontier between
Vietnam and Cambodia. Providence smiled on this operation and
another activist and I traveled to Phnom Penh the next day to
rendezvous with the refugees, interview them for their amazing
stories and guide them to safety in a South Korean diplomatic
mission there, which took them in.(see Appendix III, slides
2-5) It is difficult for me to express the disappointment I
felt in my own government's failure to act decisively in this
emergency.
In a separate case, I learned in June of this year that a
North Korean refugee had made his way to Thailand. All
indications suggested that he belonged to a nascent resistance
movement within North Korea. Due to political developments in
South Korea that this refugee deemed to be overly submissive
to Pyongyang, he hesitated to ask for resettlement in South
Korea, worrying for his own personal safety there and the
possible impediments to his continued liaison work with fellow
resistance members in North Korea. He specifically requested
assistance from activists to obtain entry into the United
States. I immediately called a US Embassy official in Seoul,
whom I had found to be both knowledgeable and helpful in
refugee matters. Outlining this refugee's remarkable
situation, I asked the embassy official if he could coordinate
communication with the State Department and his colleagues in
Thailand to consider this man's exceptional situation, for
which the North Korean Human Rights Act seemed particularly
well-suited. He did so promptly. But again, the relayed
responses from Washington and the US Embassy in Bangkok were
both opaque and equivocal. We were urged NOT to take him to
the US Embassy in Bangkok, but instead to the UNHCR office in
Thailand to determine his status as a refugee and which
country would be best suited for his resettlement. I was
assured that if the UNHCR were to recommend his resettlement
in the US, then the US would be willing to accept him. I
agreed to take him to UNHCR and immediately communicated with
the Bangkok office of the UNHCR (see Appendix IV). However, I
also notified the State Department via the US Embassy in
Seoul. that there was a high likelihood that this man's
movements were being monitored by North Korean agents in
Thailand. Therefore, I requested a non-contact security escort
for this North Korean refugee, a fellow activist and myself,
as we physically escorted this resistance figure to the UNHCR
office in Bangkok. I was told that the US Embassy in Bangkok
would not provide such security for us as we were not
diplomats. On the day we took him to the UNHCR office, we
simply invoked the power of prayer and the time-honored
promises of Psalm 91 for our protection. I'm happy to report
that no untoward incident occurred despite our obvious
vulnerability.
What has transpired in the past four months was nothing short
of a Catch-22 scenario between the UNHCR office and the US
Embassy in Bangkok (see Appendix III,slides 6-9). According to
our understanding, the US Embassy there never came forward to
declare to the UNHCR its willingness to take this refugee. We
subsequently discovered that the UNHCR in Bangkok does not
routinely make a determination of the suitability of other
possible countries of resettlement for North Korean refugees,
but instead, simply treats them as de facto South Korean
citizens. Consequently, this brave North Korean refugee fell
between the bureaucratic cracks and, at one point, ended up on
the streets of Bangkok, working as an illegal construction
worker to make ends meet. In my estimation, Mr. Chairman, this
prolonged stiff-arm of Mr. Park makes a mockery of the State
Department’s claim in its recent report to Congress that
“resettlement of North Koreans in the United States is
available in cases where this solution is deemed
appropriate.” (see Appendix V, pg. 24)
Finally, after months of waiting and flagging hopes, in early
October 2005 this refugee resigned himself to the stark
reality that the State Department would not be willing to
invoke the provisions of the North Korean Human Rights Act on
his behalf. He contacted the Republic of Korea's embassy in
Bangkok that he would go to South Korea. NGO budgets were
being strained by his continued support and need to move him
frequently to protect his security. After all, there are many
tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of other North Korean
refugees in China that are in desperate need of our attention
and resources. These “first aid” needs must always be balanced
against those in relatively “safe countries” already. To the
best of my knowledge, the refugee in Thailand continues to
await processing and remains vulnerable in that setting. This
refugee's story and our attempts to assist him through this
extended ordeal will be explored in a U.K.Channel 4/CNN
documentary on or around Nov. 11th, entitled "Undercover in
the Secret State."
Chairman Smith and Chairman Leach, in sharing these actual
North Korean refugee emergencies that my NGO has been involved
in within recent months, I wish to highlight that, in my
opinion, the US State Department is seriously out of step with
the spirit and the letter of the North Korean Human Rights
Act. To be more specific, one of the Act’s clear intents is to
facilitate refugee applications at US diplomatic missions
abroad. To my knowledge, not a single North Korean refugee has
been assisted in this way in the past 12 months since the
Act's passage. Last week’s State Department’s report confirms
this conspicuous absence of North Korean refugee applications.
Repeatedly, NGO’s have been encouraged to take North Korean
refugees to the UNHCR for processing, giving the distinct
impression that US actions hinge on UNHCR refugee referrals.
However, in the State Department’s own language in its own
report to Congress pertaining to Priority 1: Individual
Referrals of refugees, it is extremely clear that refugee
referrals can also be made by a “U.S. Embassy or a
non-governmental organization.” (see Appendix V, pg. 8)
I have personally outlined all of the above refugee operations
in personal meetings with State Department officials that
included director-level personnel in the Population, Refugees
and Migration (PRM) division in addition to frequent
communication with US Embassy personnel in Seoul, Korea. With
our demonstrated interest and prolonged involvement with North
Korean refugee protection and rescue, I am frankly quite
mystified as to why Helping Hands Korea and other NGOs in our
network were not notified of the State Department’s “third
regional training workshop for NGO humanitarian assistance
workers on how to identify and refer refugees in need of
resettlement.” that was conducted in 2005. It would seem the
perfect tool to help NGOs work together with embassies in
refugee applications (see Appendix V,pg.v).
I have also shared the above refugee emergencies in an NGO
meeting with Special Envoy Lefkowitz on his first day in his
new position at the State Department. At that time, the
Special Envoy conveyed the impression that grants had not yet
been distributed to NGOs in part due to concerns as to whether
the funds would be spent wisely. I would ask if any meaningful
inquiries have been made to ascertain which NGOs are actively
providing refugee protection and what their respective
financial track records are thus far. To my knowledge, no such
NGO survey has been carried out. What is this judgment based
upon? (Appendix III,slide 9)
One final comment, if I may, is to urge the full Congress to
swiftly pass a long-overdue appropriations bill that would
help the activist community do a better job of sheltering
North Korean refugees and guiding those at particular risk
along the so-called "underground railroad" to safety. In the
year 2004, my small NGO provided shelter spaces for well over
600 North Korean refugees hiding in China. I ordinarily do not
broadcast these types of figures, but I believe the time has
come to make an important point. More than 85% of our 2004
budget to provide safe haven for North Koreans in crisis came
not from the US, but from Europe where the memory of desperate
refugees fleeing the Stalinist regimes in the former Soviet
Union and East Germany has yet to fade from memory.
At present, another fiscal year has come to a close without
Congressional funding to support NGOs that are helping
refugees in China. I regret to say that bewilderment and
disappointment have spread to North Koreans hiding in China.
The North Korean Human Rights Act had constituted a true
beacon of hope for them, but they now wonder if the
legislation, in the end, was a relatively empty political
gesture. The EU doesn’t have its own North Korean Human Rights
Act, yet individuals and Christian organizations there are
moving proactively to help. The unfortunate circumstance at
present is that European donors are understandably assuming
that the US, in keeping with the North Korean Human Rights
Act, will now shoulder the brunt of funding for refugee
assistance and are thereby reducing their aid accordingly.
With no Congressional appropriations approved for FY 2006, we
and many other NGOs are now facing, and will continue to face
in the coming year, a dramatic shortfall in resources for this
life-saving work. I believe that sending radios and radio
signals to the North is important, but sheltering and
assisting refugees in extreme danger in China is of equal
importance. I would invoke the Biblical injunction, “This ye
ought to have done, but not to have left the other
undone.”(Lu.11.42)
I hope and even pray that you and your colleagues will show
the North Korean refugees that this Act is more than
sky-writing of the words of freedom and refugee protection,
principles that we all cherish. Indeed, they need to see that
this landmark legislation also has “landing gear” in the form
of very real and practical emergency assistance for their
plight as refugees.
Chairman Smith and Chairman Leach, thank you very much for
this opportunity to share my experiences and views. These
vitally important issues will have a crucial impact, either
directly or indirectly, on a population of 20 million enslaved
North Korean people.
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